Abstract-Collaborative spectrum sensing is an important technique to combat many random factors in cognitive radio systems. However, it is vulnerable to attacks like false reports of spectrum situation. Particularly, a hit-and-run attack policy is proposed in this paper, which cannot be be mitigated by traditional approaches of attacker detection in cognitive radio systems. Motivated by the system of points for penalizing reckless drivers in DMV, a point based attacker detection algorithm is proposed, whose effectiveness is demonstrated by numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio has attracted intensive studies in the last decade due to its capability of improving the spectrum utilization [8] . In cognitive radio systems, a secondary user (without license) can access a licensed spectrum band if primary users (without license) are not present. When primary users return, the secondary user must quit the licensed band. The key task in cognitive radio systems is spectrum sensing, i.e. detecting the existence of primary users.
It has been demonstrated that collaborative spectrum sensing [2] can significantly improve the performance of spectrum sensing by utilizing the spatial correlations of spectrum occupancies among neighboring secondary users. However, the collaboration among secondary users also brings significant vulnerability to the system. A malicious user may send false reports to the data fusion center, thus damaging the performance of spectrum sensing. For example, when primary user is not present, the attacker sends a report indicating the existence of primary users (we call it an alarm). If the fusion center uses an OR rule, i.e. decide an alarm if one or more secondary users report alarm, the secondary users will give up the spectrum opportunity, thus wasting the spectrum resource. Therefore, there is a pressing need to study the algorithms of detecting possible attackers in the collaborative spectrum sensing.
Multiple algorithms have been proposed in [1] [3] [4] [10] to defend the spectrum sensing against various attacking strategies. In [1] , a heuristic approach is used to detect the attacker while [10] applied the Bayesian approach to detect the attacker based on the assumption that the attacker's strategy has been known to the data fusion center. In [4] , the abnormality detection in the field of data mining has been applied to detect attackers in the collaborative spectrum sensing. A framework of trust values is used to detect and limit the impact of the attacker in a 'soft' manner in [3] . The problem of secure collaboration is also studied beyond cognitive radio networks, e.g. sensor networks.
In [5] [11], the framework of reputation, e.g. subjective logic, is used to update the trustiness for each sensor. The trustiness of the attacker will be decreased due to its abnormal behavior and then be excluded from the final decisions. However, in these algorithms, the attackers are assumed to adopt a stationary strategy throughout the time, which is easy to be detected by the cognitive radio system. In this paper, we consider a hit-and-run 1 attacking strategy, which is more intelligent than the attackers considered in existing studies. In such an attacking strategy, the attacker can predict the suspicious level of itself computed by the data fusion center. Once the suspicious level is close to a threshold, it stops attacking and sends honest reports such that its suspicious level keeps falling. When the attacker feels safe, it launches attacks again and repeats the above hit-and-run strategy. Obviously, the strategies in the existing studies are unable to deal with the hit-and-run attackers, since the attacker can pretend to be a 'good guy' whenever its suspicious level is close to the threshold or its trustiness has decreased to a low level, thus recovering its reputation.
To combat the intelligent strategy of the attacker, we propose a point system for the data fusion center of the cognitive radio system, which is well known in US Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). In such a system, a point will be accumulated for each secondary user when its abnormal behavior passes over a threshold. When the point value is larger than a certain threshold, the corresponding secondary user will be eliminated from the network permanently, like a revoked driver's license. As will be demonstrated by numerical results, the attacker can be effectively detected.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The system model, including the collaborative spectrum sensing and a posteriori probability computation, is introduced in Section II. The hit-and-run strategy of the attacker is shown in Section III. The corresponding point system for the defender is discussed in Section IV. Numerical results and conclusions will be provided in Sections V and VI, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the system model, which mainly includes the collaborative spectrum sensing and the computation of the a priori probabilities of being an attacker.
A. Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Consider N secondary users in the cognitive radio system, which share the same spectrum occupancy 2 . They sense the spectrum and report their local decisions (1 means the existence of primary users and 0 means no primary user) to a data fusion center. The center adopts an OR rule for the final decision, i.e. claiming no primary user if all secondary users report 0 and claiming the existence of primary users otherwise. It has been shown that this OR rule is asymptotically optimal, provided that there is no attacker [4] . For simplicity, we assume that there is one and only one attacker among the N secondary users, which will be relaxed in the numerical simulations.
We assume that the attacker knows the reports of all other honest secondary users. This can be achieved by letting the honest secondary users report first. The attacker decodes their reports and decides its report based these reports. We assume that the attacker has two modes, namely lying and honest modes. In the lying mode, the attacker sends out false reports according to its policy. In the honest mode, the attacker sends honest reports. The attacker can enter either the lying mode or the honest mode, depending on the report history. The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1 . We also assume that the data fusion center knows the strategy of the attacker, like an anti-virus software whose strategy is based on the analysis of a captured virus.
B. A Posteriori Probability Computation for Attacker Detection
Denote by T n the type, malicious (M ) or honest (H), of secondary user n. Denote by x nt the report of secondary user n at time slot t, by x t the set of reports at time slot t and by x(1 : t) the reports during time slots 1 through t. Since the data fusion center knows the strategies of the attacker, it knows the distribution of the reports conditioned on the types of all secondary users. Therefore, the a posteriori probability of 2 This is reasonable since the interruption range of primary user is usually very large due to the high requirement of spectrum sensing sensitivity secondary user n being an attacker is given by
where L n (t) is defined as
Obviously L − N (t) is the sum of the log likelihood ratio of secondary user n. We coin the a posteriori probability suspicious level. Obviously, when the suspicious level of secondary user n is high, it is highly possible that secondary user n is an attacker. Therefore, the suspicious level can be computed by the data fusion center, which claims that secondary user n is an attacker if its suspicious level passes a predetermined threshold γ 0 . This approach has been adopted in [10] .
III. ATTACKING STRATEGY: HIT AND RUN
An intelligent attacker can combat the a posteriori probability approach in [10] by setting two modes, namely lying mode and honest mode, as shown in Fig. 1 . In the lying mode, the attacker sends false reports, and in the honest mode, it sends accurate reports. Since it knows the reports of all other secondary users, it can compute its own suspicious level. When the suspicious level is larger than a threshold γ h (γ h < γ 0 ), it enters the honest mode. When the suspicious level is smaller than a threshold γ l (0 < γ l ), it enters the lying mode. This strategy is called the hit-and-run policy since the attacker leaves after launching an attacker in order to avoid the detection of the fusion center. The procedure is summarized in Procedure 1.
Procedure 1 Strategy of Hit and Run
1: Initiate the estimated suspicious level, as well as thresholds γ1 and γ2. 2: Enter the lying mode. 3: for The suspicious level is less than γ0 do 4: for The suspicious level ¡ γ h do 5: Carry out attacks. 6: Compute the suspicious level using (1). 7: end for 8: Enter the honest mode. 9: for The suspicious level ¿ γ l do 10: Send out honest reports. Enter the lying mode. 13: end for
IV. DEFENSE STRATEGY: A POINT SYSTEM
In this section, we discuss the defense strategy combating the hit-and-run attacking strategy. We first introduce the point system for the defense. Then, we analyze the performance of the point system.
A. Point System
Obviously, for the defense strategy in [10] , the attacker can attack for infinitely many times since the suspicious level never reaches the threshold γ 0 . Therefore, a new detection scheme should be found to combat the hit-and-run strategy. In this paper, we borrow the idea of the point system in Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), i.e. adding one point to the secondary user when its suspicious level passes γ h and claiming that the corresponding secondary user is an attacker when its points reach a threshold P th . To prevent false alarms, a point issued W time slots ago will be removed. In this way, the attacker cannot launch attacks forever since its points increase averagely if a suitable W is chosen. The procedure is summarized in Procedure 2. for Each legal secondary user do 4: Check all points of this secondary user; if a point is issued W time slots ago, eliminate it.
5:
Compute the suspicious level using (1). 6: if The suspicious level is larger than γ h then 7: Add one point to this user. 8: If the total number of points is larger than P th , claim that this user is an attacker and eliminate it from the network. 
B. Theoretical Performance Analysis
It is easy to verify that, when the a posteriori probability in (1) is larger than γ h , we have
Therefore, we can study the quantity L n (t) instead of P (T n = M |x(1 : t)). Obviously, L n (t) is a submartingale when the attacker is in the lying mode and a supermartingale when the attacker is in the honest mode. Suppose that L n (0) = log
. Then, by applying the Wald's Equality and omitting the excess over the boundary [7] , the expected time for the attacker to reach the threshold γ h is approximated by
where the E L [] is the expectation when the attacker is in the lying mode and the quantity E L log
is the KullbackLeibler distance between the distributions when the attacker is in the lying mode or the honest mode, respectively.
When the attacker reaches the threshold γ h , it switches into the honest mode. Then, the time needed for the attacker to decrease its suspicious level is approximated by
where the E H [] is the expectation when the attacker is in the honest mode. Then, the total time needed to detect the attacker is approximately given by (recall that P th is the total number of points for dismissing a secondary user)
since there are totally P th realizations for the attacker to increase its suspicious level from γ l to γ h and P th − 1 realizations for the attacker to decrease its suspicious level from γ h to γ l .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the numerical simulation, we adopt the signal model in [10] , in which N = 10, i.e. there are 10 secondary users. We assume that the power of primary user is 200mW and the noise power is -110dBm. The distance of secondary users to the primary user is randomly distributed within 1000m and 2000m. The timebandwidth product is set to 5. We assume that the transmit power of primary user is 200mW. The noise level is set to -110dBm. The received power is attenuated by Rayleigh fast fading and path loss (with a path loss factor of 3). Other details can be found in [10] . Note that each statistic (miss detection and false alarm) is obtained from 4000 realizations. However, there still exists some fluctuation due to the small false alarm and miss detection rates. Figures 2 and 3 show the traces of the suspicious levels of different users and the receiver operational characteristic (ROC) curve, respectively. In Fig. 2 , we can see the suspicious level of the attacker (marked with circles) increases and decreases for several rounds due to the hit-and-run strategy; finally, its suspicious level becomes 1 permanently. From the ROC curve in Fig. 3 , we can see that both the false alarm and miss detection rates are very small.
A. One Attacker Case

B. Two Attacker Case
We relax the assumption that there is only one attacker and assume that there are two attackers. The traces of the suspicious levels of the two attackers are shown in Fig. 4 . We observe the ebbs and flows of the attackers due to their hit-and-run strategy. The ROC curve of the point based attacker detection is shown in Fig. 5 . We observe that both the false alarm and miss detection probabilities are very small, which implies that the proposed point system can effectively combat the hit-and-run attacking strategy. 
C. Three Attacker Case
The case of three attackers is shown in Figures 6 and 7 . Again, we observe that the proposed algorithm can effectively detect the attackers even though there are three attackers out of ten secondary users.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a hit-and-run attacking strategy in the collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio systems, which can hardly be addressed by existing defense strategies, since the suspicious level of the attacker will never reach the threshold for claiming the detection of an attacker. To combat this hit-andrun strategy, we have proposed a point system based attacker detection scheme, in which a user will be dismissed if its points accumulate to a certain number, like revoking a driver's licensed in DMV. The procedure of the attacker detection is analyzed based on Wald's Equality, which yields an approximation for the time needed to detect an attacker. Numerical results show that the proposed point system can effectively alleviate the hitand-run attack strategy, even if there exist multiple attackers. 
